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‘The Climate Has Always Been Changing’: Sarah Palin, Climate Change 
Denialism, and American Conservatism 
 
Abstract 
Celebrity politician Sarah Palin diffused climate denialism, while advocating a version of social 
and political conservatism. This article scrutinises her rhetoric and argues that she crafted and 
performed a brand or ethos that resonated with common-sense conservatism, while at the same 
time reinforcing and popularising this doctrine. The article discerns the epistemological and 
ontological premises of Palin’s ideological position and probes how she used her image as an 
anti-intellectual, frontier individual to speak common sense and to advocate free-market 
ideology and climate denialism. The article, then, contributes to our understanding of how 
celebrity politicians craft and use ethos to promote anti-environmental agendas and ideological 
positions. It also highlights the embeddedness of climate denialism in the political conviction 
that Palin espoused.  
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The celebritisation of climate change advocacy is well-observed (A. Anderson 2011; 
Brockington 2009; Boykoff and Goodman 2009). In their introduction to a special issue in 
this journal, Goodman and Littler (2013) observe that to speak about ‘celebrity ecologies’ is 
to think about the imbrication between celebrity culture and ‘nature’, as well as the forms, or 
ecologies, such relationships take. The relevant scholarship is divided on the impact of the 
celebritisation trend. On the one hand, its is argued that ‘star-powered’ advocacy can be 
instrumental in mobilising and building social-movement infrastructure, as it helps raise 
visibility of environmental issues, shape the public’s perception of environmental crises, and 
orient human relation to the natural environment (Alexander 2013; Anderson 2013; Thrall et 
al. 2008). On the other, increased attention to environmentalisms that are mediated and 
embodied by celebrities functions as a distraction that displaces experts, relegates citizens to 
fans, and results in the creation of a public incapable of forming judgment (Weiskel 2005).  
As Goodman et al (2016) show, such spectacular environmentalisms forge individualised 
responses to problems that indeed require collective and structural solutions, thus raising 
questions on the actual effectiveness of celebrity advocacy. Invariably, though, this diverse 
scholarship concurs that celebrity voices shape meaning, values, and knowledge around 
environmental issues.  
This article shows how this impact is constituted by attending to a topic that has received 
less attention: the role of celebrities in the advocacy of denialism.1 A prominent contribution 
in this particular topic is Boykoff and Olson (2013) who examine celebrity contrarian 
voices—public intellectuals who used increased media coverage to denounce the credibility 
of climate science and scientists. Evidently, ‘the denial machine’ has systematically employed 
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celebrities to promote anti-regulatory discourses and ideas, as well as to attack the scientific 
underpinnings of climate change policy (Begley 2007; Dunlap and McCright 2011). Along 
with books and other publications funded by conservative think tanks and advocacy groups, 
messages disseminated by politicians (such as Inhofe’s ‘climate change is the greatest hoax 
ever perpetrated on the American people’), and views expressed by commentators on 
platforms such as Fox News and Washington Post, celebrity deniers created a constant flow of 
arguments against the reality of climate change. The rise of right-wing populism has 
intensified public attention to climate deniers such as Trump; however, this is far from a new 
phenomenon.
This article explores the thread of climate denialism that runs through American 
conservatism by scrutinising how celebrity politician Sarah Palin advanced denialism in the 
years that this doctrine was not represented institutionally at the White House (2008-2016). 2  
Although her rise and fall in national politics were quick, she earned the loyalty of Tea Party 
supporters (Wheeler 2013). Yet, her unconventional public character granted her the status of 
celebrity as she became the front face of the American conservative movement. Ultimately, 
Palin was instrumental in diffusing common-sense conservatism, a peculiar political 
conviction that speaks to ideas that appeal to the conservative middle class, such as freedom 
of markets, social conservatism, and environmental anti-regulation. The article probes how 
Palin systematically made the case against climate science and the anthropogenic causes of 
climate change by exploiting her celebrity capital (Driessens 2013). Palin appealed to 
conservative common sense attempting to channel and reinforce Tea Party supporters’ 
mistrust of science and rejection of the anthropogenic causes of climate change (Hamilton 
and Saito 2015).  
In their discussion of the link between political conservatism and climate denialism, 
Boykoff and Olson (2013, 278) suggest that ‘labels of contrarianism must be cautiously 
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derived by evaluating the content of the claims themselves, rather than the attributes of claim-
makers or their funding sources’; otherwise, ‘analyses run the risk of dismissing legitimate 
and potentially useful critiques out of hand by dismissing the individual rather than the 
arguments put forward’. This is a legitimate concern that calls attention to the importance of 
analysing arguments or what in rhetoric is called logos, rather than merely to who speaks. 
Yet, ethos—the speaker’s character—is an indispensable component of communication; the 
fact that celebrities enjoy enhanced visibility further strengthens the case for placing their 
ethos under systematic scrutiny. At the same time, the study of ‘celebrity ecologies’ brings 
into spotlight ‘the larger assemblages and systems within and around which celebrity is 
enmeshed’ (Goodman and Littler 2013, 270), a concern shared also by those who study ethos.    
This article, then, brings together rhetorical scholarship and celebrity studies, offering an 
analytical framework for studying how celebrities shape social meaning. The study of ethos 
brings attention to discourse, its agent, and the context within which the speaker’s character 
emerges, thus corresponding to the task outlined above by Boykoff and Olson and Goodman 
and Littler. Aristotle (2001, 74–75) observed that ethos is an artistic component of 
communication; it is constructed within and produced through speech itself, rather than 
deduced from the audience’s prior knowledge of the speaker’s character. Building on this 
point, the article probes Palin’s ethos, and so the denialist discourse that she offered and the 
social and political context within which she operated. The analysis  draws on a set of 
primary (speeches, articles penned by Palin, broadcasted interviews, videos uploaded in 
social media) and secondary sources from scholarship and beyond.  
The first section offers a brief overview of common-sense conservatism and its connection 
to denialism, providing thus context for the analysis that follows. The second section 
discusses how Palin achieved the status of celebrity politician and was perceived as 
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personifying the ‘girl of conservative’s dreams’ (Baxter 2008). The analysis identifies two 
elements that ground common-sense conservatism: ontological dualism and epistemological 
populism. Palin crafted, embodied, and performed an ethos infused by these two topoi and 
projected in the form of frontier authenticity and anti-intellectualism. The third and fourth 
sections analyse a series of instances in which Palin exploited these elements to promote 
climate denialism. The article, then, sketches Palin’s place in ‘the denial machine’; it also 
illustrates the link between common-sense conservatism and climate denialism. More 
broadly, the analysis shows a way of approaching the role of celebrities in the production of 
common sense and is thus of interest to those who study how social meaning is created and 
disseminated. Rather than functioning merely as a tank that celebrities tap into to enhance 
their popularity, the discussion demonstrates how celebritires constitute and perform common 
sense through their ethos.    
 
Common-sense Conservatism and Climate Denialism  
There is a strong association between the conservative movement and the persistent grip of 
climate denialism on American public culture (Jacques et al 2008). Since the 1970s the 
neoconservative and Christian right perceived environmentalism and the introduction of 
environmental regulation policies as a threat to the neoliberal project (Antonio and Brulle 
2011). Scientific evidence on climate change and the need for environmental regulation 
became the target of a well-orchestrated campaign of the fossil-fuel industry, conservative 
think tanks, front groups, politicians, and contrarian scientists. This campaign sought to 
discredit climate science, challenge the need for environmental regulation, and promote—
even manufacture—climate denialism, with the support of Murdoch’s media outlets 
(McCright and Dunlap 2003; Oreskes and Conway 2010). One of these outlets, Fox News, 
played a pivotal role in covering the activities of the Tea Party, one of the latest 
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manifestations of the ‘anti-establishment conservatism’ that appeared in American public life 
since the 1960s and became the new establishment thanks to the powerful influence of the 
new Christian right (Horowitz 2013). Far from merely a political group, the Tea Party was 
also ‘a vital cultural force’ (Skocpol and Williamson 2016, 136). Palin along with Glenn 
Beck, Bill O’Reilly, Sean Hannity, and their ilk widely diffused a version of conservatism 
branded as common-sense which was particularly appealing to those who favoured Tea Party 
(Beck 2009).  
Scepticism and even outright denial of climate change were ‘among the articles of faith’ of 
the Tea Party movement (Broder 2010). For some of its members denialism is linked to 
religious conviction; for others it is driven by distrust of those they call ‘the elites’. In the era 
under scrutiny, Tea Party supporters were less likely than other conservatives to trust 
scientists for environmental information, to think that environmental rules have a positive 
effect, or that it is important to conserve natural resources for the future (Hamilton and Saito 
2015). The percentage of Tea Party members who believed that climate change was 
happening was significantly lower compared to that of supporters of other parties: 50 percent 
of Tea Party members believed that climate change is naturally caused, 21 percent that it is 
not happening at all (Leiserowitz et al. 2011). Despite the variety of reasons for which they 
rejected climate science (religion, distrust for intellectual elites, conspiracy), Tea Party 
supporters—who in 2010 accounted for a fifth of voting-age Americans—fervently dismissed 
environmental regulation. Among these supporters climate denialism was common sense: 
environmental regulation entailed enhanced central government control, including taxation, 
and obstruction to the function and freedom of the market (Beck 2009; Lee Ray 1994). 
Polarisation is linked with ideological orientation. Individuals segregate into political 
parties that align with their beliefs, therefore elite cues supported by media coverage, 
decisively shape public concern about environmental issues (Brulle et al 2012). Media often 
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turn to climate contrarians for alternative views on climate change for example, during the 
Copenhagen Climate Summit in 2009 Fox News interviewed Palin to juxtapose her view to 
that of Al Gore’s (Boykoff 2011). The fact that media framed Palin as the leader of the Tea 
Party enhanced her credibility and visibility, enabling her to become an eminent clog in ‘the 
denial machine’. At the same time, as party leader she had to perform values and ideas 
supported by her audience, embodying its common sense, while shaping it through mediated 
performances disseminated by ‘the denial machine’.  
 
Crafting Sarah Palin 
Street (2004, 437–38) distinguishes between celebrity politician and celebrity politician, with 
the former being the ‘politician or candidate who uses the forms and associations of the 
celebrity to enhance their image and communicate their message’. Although Palin (2009a, 
300) explicitly rejected the significance of celebrity endorsements for the promotion of public 
policy, she became a celebrity herself. Her celebritisation was the outcome both of her own 
rhetorical labour and of the media that reproduced and amplified it. In 2008 crafting an 
appealing ethos was a high stake for Palin and her campaigning team, since at the time of her 
nomination as McCain’s running mate she was holding the post of the Governor of Alaska 
and therefore her recognisability was limited. A day after McCain announced her nomination, 
polls showed that the majority of Americans had never heard of Sarah Palin (Newport 2008). 
Ultimately, she earned the status of celebritician (Sullivan 2014).  
This was achieved thanks to journalistic practices such as hyper-personalisation, meta-
coverage, and the fusion of entertainment and news (Young 2011). Media focused on her 
physical appearance and Palin, who is also a former beauty-pageant, was branded as ‘sexy 
celebrity’, providing inspiration for a series of artefacts, such as Alaskan license plates that 
read ‘Alaska; o-mama!  where the air is cold, and the governor is hot!’ (Anderson 2011). 
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Scholars define her pattern of speech as argutainment: it is ‘passionate, simple and 
entertaining’. This ultimately helped ‘establishing the political preferences and views 
privileged’ by the hosts of the programs that she appeared and the audiences exposed to this 
mode of communication (Saurette et al. 2011). These mediated choices enabled her to project 
a familiar and approachable ethos and to be framed by media and audiences as ‘authentic’ 
and ‘sincere’. Palin was never among the most powerful women in American politics, but she 
was certainly one of the most recognisable. 
The ‘Palin effect’ has left its imprint on American conservatism. As the first woman to be 
nominated for the Republican national ticket, Palin was credited with attracting to politics 
those frequently depicted as apathetic or apolitical, and was framed as prompting ‘an outburst 
of women’s activism unusual among conservatives’ (Vogel 2010). In 2009 she founded 
SarahPAC (terminated in late 2016), a political action committee ‘dedicated to building 
America’s future by supporting fresh ideas and candidates who share our vision for reform 
and innovation.’ Palin had a strong record electing conservatives that she endorsed, with 
candidates and organisations paying as much as $100,000 to receive her public endorsement 
(Bullock and Hood 2012). Her support was particularly influential in areas where Obama was 
unpopular; veteran strategist Ron Bonjean observed that ‘Palin’s endorsement adds a boost of 
nitroglycerin’ (Sullivan 2014). Her  2010 Tea Party Convention Speech was received as a 
party leader speech and her media visibility energised the conservative base of the 
Republican Party which was particularly attracted to her pro-life profile (Klein 2010; Vogel 
2010; Dombrink 2015, 38). Additionally, as Ferguson (2009, 3) observes, ‘Palin serves as a 
potent relay point in a conservative ideological apparatus’. She was received as embodying 
the principles of ‘anti-establishment conservatism’ and she crafted a personal brand around 
these principles. She then utilised this brand to mold public sentiments and attitudes on issues 
from abortion to climate change, earning a long-lasting presence in American public life that 
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extends well beyond the period of her candidacy for the Vice Presidency. 
Palin didn’t merely embody conservative principles; she also shaped the values and 
common sense of her audience. Through her public appearances, she disseminated common-
sense conservatism, forging this ideological position and establishing it as a calculable 
ideological force in American politics, while fixing climate denialism firmly in public 
discourse. She became the frontwoman of common-sense conservatism by embodying and 
performing an ethos that reflected the values of a constituent part of the American 
conservative base; her media visibility entailed that this ethos was also widely reproduced.  
A rhetorical tool that is particularly useful in the hands of those who seek to influence 
political judgment whilst striving to construct their ethos is commonplaces, or topoi. Topoi 
represent common lines of socially situated argument, shared patterns of reasoning, or 
prevailing argumentative practices that are pertinent to the task of political actors who 
advance ideological positions (Sovacool 2008, 344). Celebrities are particularly well-
positioned to shape common sense by reproducing these familiar lines of argument and 
demonstrating their importance for the community; by doing so, they attune themselves to 
particular audiences, thus enhancing their ethos.   
Palin defined and shaped common-sense conservatism in a series of rhetorical events. 
The media visibility that she gained amplified her opportunities to disseminate the ideas of 
common-sense conservatism that appealed to Tea Party supporters (Tyrrell Emmett 2013). 
The following section identifies and analyses two topoi that function as organising sources 
for Palin’s ethos: frontier authenticity and anti-intellectualism. These topoi are then linked to 
the ontological and epistemological premises of Palin’s (anti)-environmental position, as well 
as of her common-sense conservatism. The analysis shows how Palin’s systematic reliance 
on these two topoi elevated her to a central public figure of the strand of American 
conservatism that favours climate denialism.  
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A frontier individual 
Palin propagated her version of conservatism in her biography, Going Rogue, where she 
referred to her common-sense sentiment, ideas, and political agenda as the distinct element 
that infused her political conviction, but also her ability to resolve practical problems 
effectively. She described common-sense conservatism as a social and political stance that 
affirms the fallibility of human nature, as well as the human ability to create, improve, and 
innovative; the limited, protective—rather than perfecting, as she calls it—role of 
government; and the constraining character of the market’s rules (Palin 2010a, 385–87, 
2009b). Because her worldview was based on common sense, she argued, she was in position 
to be both pro-development and pro-environment (Palin 2010a, 273). She thus justified her 
(anti)environmental stance by appealing to a marker of free market ideology: the possibility 
to advance economic development while protecting the natural environment.   
This line of arguing is congruent with Cartesian dualism, an ontological position that has 
marked modernity. This logic affirms humans and nature as components of a binary: humans 
are separate from and dominant over nature. This perspective finds expression in the vision of 
progress as a linear (economic) project fueled by resources extracted from the natural 
environment. It perceives nature as a set of resources available for humans to exploit, enjoy, 
but also conserve in order for the cycle of exploitation to be sustained and progress to 
continue. Ontological dualism is not the intellectual property of conservatism; it infuses other 
ideological positions, too. Yet, it is the ontological stance that characterised the Holocene, the 
geological era of relative geological stability that enabled human civilizations to thrive. What 
makes it especially relevant here is that it is imbricated in denialist arguments against 
environmentalism, which was early on perceived as a growing threat to the idea of progress, 
the American way of life, and the principles associated with it, particularly individual 
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freedom and common sense (Ray and Guzzo 1993; Tocqueville 1966, 228). With the arrival 
of the Anthropocene—the new geological era that is characterised by the recognition of 
humanity as a geological force that profoundly shapes Earth systems (Crutzen and Stoermer 
2000)—the dualistic ontological framework of the Holocene is out of step with the new 
physical reality.  
Palin exemplified this ontological stance through the performance of the ethos of frontier 
individual. Frontier authenticity is congruent with a narrative familiar to Americans and 
associated with the story of pioneers who inventively transformed vast, ‘empty’ spaces into 
resources available to fuel human progress (Cronon 1991). Palin used this particular topos to 
craft the image of ordinary, self-relying individual from a remote yet familial area, rather 
than the buzzing and supercilious DC. Reinforced with pictures in which she was enjoying 
activities in nature, the ethos of frontier authenticity cultivated and projected by Palin and 
media was structured around the exaggeration of her small-town background. She was 
framed as someone who had direct experience of the natural environment, as every ‘ordinary 
American’ who lives in a rural area. To enhance the appeal of this ethos, Palin featured in 
photoshoots carrying firearms, hunting wild animals, and bearing fishing and military 
equipment. In her nomination acceptance speech, she abstractly celebrated the ‘small town’ 
as the place inhabited by honest and dignified people, a place she knew first-hand, because 
she ‘grew up with those people’, ‘the ones who do some of the hardest work in America… 
fight our wars …and they’re always proud of America’(Palin 2008). These are the people that 
Palin aspired to attract with her appraisal of the small-town identity.3 By identifying herself 
as the mayor of such a place, Palin sought to enhance her ethos as an authentic but pragmatic 
politician who dealt with actual political problems. Indeed, the role of the mayor is one that 
her audience could probably better grasp and affirm as counting towards actual political 
experience. She was not just some ‘community organiser’—a subtle yet well-targeted 
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comment against Obama and his previous political experience; she was an engaged politician 
who understood people’s real problems.  
The use of lay language further enhanced Palin’s ethos of frontier authenticity and 
distinguished her from the ‘educated elite’. Her colloquial casual speech pattern helped her 
connect with people and sound ordinary, authentic, and unpretentious. Palin was a frequent 
user of demonstratives (this, that, those) and first-person indexicals (we, us, our), which 
create a sense of proximity and collectivity between the speaker and hearer (Acton and Potts 
2014). She consistently employed remarkably informal patterns of speech that aimed at 
enhancing her authenticity and used euphemisms such as ‘darn’ and ‘hern’ to sound ordinary 
yet distinct (Purnell et al 2009). Palin mastered the ethos of authenticity by appearing and 
sounding authentic.  
Palin’s performance of a particular version of motherhood also complemented her ethos of 
authentic individual. During her acceptance speech she proclaimed herself ‘an average 
hockey mom’, thus claiming the identity of an ordinary individual, a hard-working mum with 
a demanding job and common-sense values. Advocating the idea of motherhood as norm, 
Palin alluded to the powerful image of the native in North America grizzly bear to turn 
motherhood into a collective political identity (Rodino-Colocina 2012, 81). Ultimately, she 
achieved to gather around her a dynamic base of conservative women, who would form a 
particularly popular section of the Tea Party movement: Mama Grizzlies. When she 
identified members of the audience of a speech in 2010 as ‘Mama Grizzlies’ for the first time, 
Palin constituted rhetorically a unique political identity of mums ‘who are rising up’ in the 
way that ‘the mama grizzly bears rise up on their hind legs when somebody’s coming to 
attack their cubs, to do something adverse toward their cubs’; these women, who ‘you don't 
want to mess with… are banding together, rising up, saying no: this isn’t right for our kids 
and for our grandkids’ (Palin 2010b). By performing the identity of common-sense 
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conservative, Palin sought to fuse motherhood and masculinist traits, the caring mama grizzly 
and the frontier individual who masters her natural environment in a masculinist way in order 
to survive. As a result, media coverage of the 2008 campaign frequently used adjectives such 
as ‘energetic’, ‘tough’, ‘ambitious’, ‘determined’, ‘pragmatic’ and ‘strong’ to refer to Palin, 
contributing to the construction of a brand that appealed to male and female conservative 
voters (Wasburn and Wasburn 2011).  
 
An anti-intellectual politician 
Palin’s reliance on personal experience for the formation of political judgment is a 
manifestation of the stance that can be called epistemological populism. The distinct element 
of this peculiar epistemological framework is that it grounds social and political judgment on 
personal experience (Saurette et al. 2011, 196). This framework valorises certain types of 
experience as reliable sources of legitimate knowledge and extends this form of knowledge to 
unrelated issues while dismissing academic and scientific knowledge as elitist. 
Epistemological populism finds expression in anti-intellectualism and renders common sense 
the ultimate point of reference for reliable knowledge. Anti-intellectualism also undergirds 
climate denialism by displacing the notion of expertise and asserting the primacy of personal 
experience and practical, local knowledge in the formation of judgment.  
Palin alluded to her personal experience of local natural environment to claim political 
knowledge. She affirmed political agency through her active lifestyle, which allowed her to 
have informed insight into animal behavior, a type of knowledge that then gave her access to 
an instinctive understanding of the world. She used this anti-intellectual line of thought, 
which also essentialises gender identity, to explain how ‘Mama Grizzlies’ were drawn to 
politics by their instinctual understanding of danger, their natural impulse to protect their 
children from political decisions taken for them by ‘immoral, unethical’ political elites in 
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Washington. In contrast to common-sense conservative ethos, these elites keep ‘spending 
endlessly and running up dangerously unsustainable debt and deficits’ which they expect that 
children will pay in the future. ‘Mama Grizzlies’ understand politics because their embodied 
experience of motherhood gives them access to a special kind of knowledge.  
Palin used the marker of anti-intellectualism to juxtapose her ethos with what she referred 
to as ‘the Washington elites’. She employed her image as frontier, rogue politician to 
discredit the ethos of the political establishment, thus reaching out to voters whose anti-
intellectual sentiment would turn them away from politicos. Unlike them, she joined politics 
as a member of the Parents and Teachers Association because she wanted to make her ‘kid’s 
public education better’ (Palin 2008). Entering politics does not require any form of 
expertise—Palin boasted she ‘didn’t need focus groups and voters’ profiles’—but rather a 
value-driven understanding of public issues; anyone can join professional politics, as long as 
they hold values such as wishing a better education for their kids. Palin’s anti-intellectualism 
valorised the knowledge of ‘ordinary people’ and grounded political skill on everyday 
experience. The next section discusses more specifically how this epistemological populism 
infused her climate denialism.  
Her resignation from Alaska’s governorship in July 2009 enhanced her profile as a 
political ‘outsider’. With her frontier authenticity and anti-intellectualism, Palin was the 
average mum who could understand and empathise with the life of ordinary Americans (Beail 
and Longworth 2013). She was a practical politician, an outsider to the political 
establishment, who disrupted politics-as-usual in DC and the Republican Party. Her multiple 
capacity as an outsider—mum, average citizen, maverick reformer—allowed her to stand out 
as an anti-elitist political figure and to feature as the front woman of common-sense 
conservatism and the Tea Party movement. Palin’s enduring presence in media platforms 
since 2008 facilitated the streaming of ideas, values, fears, and expectations shared among 
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some segments of the conservative population, defining them as a political community and 
contributing to the perception of Palin’s ethos and ideas as common sense. As a celebritician, 
she also became a clog in ‘the denial machine’ that advanced a culture of distrust of experts 
and promoted climate denialism.  
 
‘Drill, baby, drill’  
As one of the Tea Party’s front faces, Palin was awarded airtime and press coverage to 
express her views, thus playing an important role in molding and advancing denialist 
perceptions of climate change. Her exhortations for drilling in the Arctic echoed and 
amplified the voices of conservatives who affiliated with the Tea Party; these conservatives 
typically viewed environmental regulation as a factor that could hinder economic growth and 
cost jobs (Leiserowitz et al. 2011). Her views also resonated with evangelicals who supported 
a pro-business approach to environmental issues and objected to federal or international 
regulation (Prelli et al. 2009). Palin’s link of environmental issues with the protection of jobs 
in the coal and oil industry sounded common sense to these audiences.  
   Denialism was not always the defining element in Palin’s environmental track-record. 
As Alaska’s Governor, in 2007 she established the Alaska Climate Change Sub-Cabinet to 
implement policy in order ‘to identify and mitigate potential impacts of climate change and to 
guide efforts in evaluating and addressing known or suspected causes of climate change’ 
(State of Alaska 2007). The document, signed by Palin, employed the narrative of science-
driven policy, explicitly appealing to the authority of climate scientists to justify the need for 
taking action and framing climate change as a multidimensional issue. It stated that ‘scientific 
evidence shows many areas of Alaska are experiencing a warming trend. Many experts 
predict that Alaska […] will continue to warm at a faster pace than any other state, and the 
warming will continue for decades. Climate change is not just an environmental issue. It is 
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also a social, cultural, and economic issue important to all Alaskans’ (State of Alaska 2007). 
Nonetheless, this statement reveals Palin’s ontological dualism and her extractive beliefs as it 
advocates that ‘commercialising Alaska’s great natural gas reserves through a new pipeline 
will improve the nation’s energy security while providing a clean, low carbon fuel to help the 
nation reduce its overall greenhouse gas emissions’. Palin herself was a fervent supporter of 
the project for a pipeline that would enable the extraction of natural gas from Alaska’s North 
Slope.  
The ontological dualism that infuses Palin’s worldview also underscored her rhetoric 
during the Vice-Presidential Debate in October 2008. Palin advanced her Holocene views 
reinstating topoi that would sound commonsensical to her conservative audience. During the 
debate she linked environmental protection to energy independence and she framed the latter 
as an economic and national security issue, thus framing as ‘nonsensical’ the choice to leave 
national energy resources unexploited, particularly considering the existing ‘domestic 
supplies of energy’ (Palin and Biden 2008). She presented her proposal for energy 
independence as common sense, as it would be the solution not just to the country’s 
economic problems, but also to global climate change:  an energy independent US could rely 
less ‘on countries that don’t care as much about the climate’ as the US does. She used the 
euphemism ‘clean, green’ energy to refer to natural gas that would be extracted through a 
process of ‘safe, environmentally-friendly drilling offshore’, a new technology ‘with tiny 
footprints even on land’ (Palin and Biden 2008). Exhorting an imaginary environmental 
record of the US (consistently the second largest global emitter after China since 2005) vis-à-
vis other countries, but also talking comfortably about extraction methods, Palin amplified 
her authority as a pro-environmental, knowledgeable public figure who cares both about the 
natural world and the American economy and security. Palin proclaimed publicly her 
ontological position by reinforcing a marker of free-market ideology: economic growth and 
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environmental protection are intertwined. Her reference to domestic energy as a source to be 
‘tapped into’ illuminates the function of epistemological populism. The analogy of US energy 
sources as ‘taps’ and therefore as a familiar, everyday use object that audience could easily 
visualise and relate to, transformed an ambiguous, dangerous process—oil and natural gas 
extraction—into a seemingly ordinary, straightforward, and uncomplicated process. Palin 
argued that it was not a surprise that ‘drill, baby, drill’ became a national chant: it resonated 
with laypeople’s ‘hunger’ for exploiting domestic energy.  
A few months later Palin penned an op-ed for Washington Post in which she framed 
Obama’s proposed cap-and-trade energy plan as ‘an enormous threat to American economy’, 
since it would ‘undermine its recovery’ from the global financial crisis (Palin 2009c). In a 
series of arguments infused by epistemological populism, she appealed to her frontier 
experience as an Alaskan to talk about ‘the inherent link between energy and prosperity, 
energy and opportunity, and energy and security’, thus linking energy with three 
commonplaces particularly appealing to conservatives and to proponents of free market 
ideology. Appealing to epistemological populism, she amplified her personal experience 
elevating it to common knowledge among people in Alaska, who understand better than 
‘Washington bureaucrats’ the importance of transporting ‘clean, natural gas to hungry 
markets around America’. At the same time, her ontological position was evidenced in the 
view that ‘meeting energy needs and environmental challenges’ at the same time is possible, 
while she forged this argument as a common-sense alternative to job losses, rising cost of 
transportation and business, and skyrocketing energy bills. Although Palin didn’t explain how 
these repercussions would result from the cap-and-tax plan proposed by Obama, she justified 
the possibility of bridging economic growth and energy independence by invoking a 
commonplace that would resonate particularly well with the ontological commitments of the 
conservative base: religious faith. Invoking Biblical tenets, she explained that ‘if we 
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responsibly tap the resources that God created right underfoot on American soil’ it is possible 
to have economic growth, energy independence, and environmental protection. Hence, she 
justified the exploitation of natural resources while simultaneously attempting to win over the 
religious conservative base and reinforcing free-market ideology by appealing to a higher 
moral order.  
In December 2009, as world leaders gathered in Copenhagen to discuss pathways to 
climate change mitigation in the context of a high-profile UN summit, the Washington Post 
published another article—which was reproduced by other media in the US and the UK—
authored by Palin who this time explicitly endorsed climate denialism. Considering her link 
to the ultra-conservative advocacy group Americans for Prosperity, funded by Koch 
Industries, Palin’s outright denial of the reality of climate change at this point is not 
unjustified. Formed in 2008, the group embarked on an aggressive campaign aimed at 
electing lawmakers who would block cap-and-trade legislation protecting the interest of the 
fossil fuel industry (Davenport and Lipton 2017; Skocpol and Williamson 2016, 104–6). At 
the core of Palin’s narrativewas Climategate, a then-unfolding case of hacking that brought 
into publicity emails exchanged between climate scientists at the University of East Anglia. 
According to Palin (2009d), Climategate demonstrated that climate science is politicised and 
therefore those ‘so-called climate experts’ were untrustworthy, since they had ‘deliberately 
destroyed records, manipulated data to hide the decline in global temperatures and to silence 
their critics’. She then linked this case with the Climate Summit by pointing to the role that 
this ‘highly politicised scientific circle’ plays in informing ‘efforts at the Copenhagen climate 
change conference’. By alluding to a scandal that had drawn the attention of the international 
media, Palin attempted to discredit one of the most anticipated climate summits by 
associating it to ‘fraudulent scientific practices’. She took the opportunity to reinstate her 
support for ‘responsible development’ and ‘common-sense policies’ and urged Obama to 
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‘boycott Copenhagen’, arguing that ‘good environmental policymaking is about weighing 
real-world costs and benefits—not pursuing a political agenda’. 
Her ethos as common-sense conservative proved to be a valuable source for inventing 
arguments for climate denialism on this occasion. Palin drew on her experience as the 
governor of ‘the only Arctic state’ who ‘took a stand against politicised science’ when she 
‘sued the federal government over its decision to list the polar bear as an endangered species’ 
and who created ‘a sub-cabinet to deal specifically with… changing weather patterns’. 
Although she did not deny the fact of climate change per se, she challenged the scientific 
consensus on its anthropogenic causes and capitalised on the uncertainty that is inherent—
and so vital—to the scientific enterprise, to attack its credibility and discredit its authority. 
Additionally, the adoption of a cost-benefit perspective to discuss emissions reduction 
policies further evidenced her commitment to an approach to environmental problems that 
placed her in line with free market conservatives and indeed with some of the most 
ambiguous figures of the climate denial movement (Oreskes and Conway 2010, 84). 
Performing her frontier ethos, she drew on epistemological populism to argue that she was in 
position to have direct knowledge of changing weather patterns and therefore to interpret 
climate change as an occurrence of ‘natural, cyclical environmental trends’. She also stated 
that ‘we can’t say with assurance that man’s activities cause weather changes’. Her personal 
experience of a local environment was elevated to legitimate knowledge of the global Earth 
system. Her practical knowledge of the Arctic innately enabled Palin to create rhetorical links 
between a series of concepts, which however have no apparent or inherent relation: ‘energy 
independence’ with ‘national security’, ‘domestic drilling’ with ‘responsible development’, 
and ‘environmental regulation’ with ‘economic stagnation’. Palin embodied and performed 
the extractive ideology that affirms nature as a local set of resources dominated by a single 




‘The Climate Has Always Been Changing’ 
The attack on climate science and its experts reached new highs when Palin’s popularity 
soared as the front face of the Tea Party and conservative advocacy groups such as 
Americans for Prosperity. In February 2010 during a speech she delivered before a logging 
conference in California she associated again environmental regulation with lower levels of 
economic growth, arguing that the State’s regulatory environment hinders the success of 
businesses and ‘shuts down development’ (CBS News 2010). Furthermore, she exploited the 
rhetorical occasion—addressing an audience that is historically hostile to regulation—to 
brand climate science as ‘a bunch of snake oil science’. The lack of press coverage of the 
specific event does not allow us to gain full insight into Palin’s rhetoric. However, she 
repeated those attacks against climate science in 2014, only a few days before the publication 
of the Fifth IPCC Assessment Report, which would set the scene for the climate negotiations 
in the COP21 in Paris.  
‘Junk science’ is a term invented by deniers to degrade scientific results that certain 
industries disapprove of (Oreskes and Conway 2010). Palin used this term to discredit 
climate science in a short video which she uploaded on her personal YouTube channel in 
2014 and which functions as an instance of the epistemological and ontological stance 
represented and performed by Palin. In the video, she set herself the task of explaining to her 
audience the nature of climate science and its place in the system of scientific knowledge. 
Aiming to direct blame and channel grievance towards the environmental movement and 
liberal politicians (‘the elite’), Palin argued that cutting emissions translates to ‘losing jobs, 
wrecking the coal industry, and dramatically hurting [US] economy’. By reproducing the 
familiar argument replicated by deniers—environmental regulation is a threat to the national 
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economy—and particularly by linking regulation with effects that the lay-person could 
associate with such as unemployment, Palin defended free market ideology and its 
fundamental tenet that markets can guarantee the protection of the environment. Employing 
the folksy style that made her popular, Palin attempted to defend her ideological and 
ontological position and to garner support for the conservative movement and its anti-
regulatory theses.    
Palin appealed to her role as Alaska’s former governor to explain to her audience what she 
called ‘the con job’ of the climate change agenda. In a manifestation of epistemological 
populism, she claimed that her local knowledge and experience of Alaska’s climate allowed 
her to have informed opinion on weather changes. Therefore, she was a credible source to 
assess these changes and to identify them as ‘cyclical patterns of climate’ rather than as an 
indication of a larger change. Her experiential evidence was asserted as a credible source of 
knowledge that was far more reliable and relatable than knowledge produced by elitist 
science discourses.  
What epistemological populism misses, though, is the fact that the production of scientific 
knowledge depends on collective labour and consensus accumulated over the years between 
those who study sets of facts and phenomena, rather than on the experience of a single person 
or common sense. Although observation is essential in producing scientific knowledge, the 
scientific enterprise requires the collection of evidence on a scale much larger and more 
precise than a single individual can perform. Despite that the authority of one scientist or of 
someone with local knowledge can function as a credible source in the process of knowledge 
production, this is not the case with climate science, the complexity and scope of which well 
surpasses—despite encompassing—local knowledges and individual experience. Palin’s 
valorisation of local knowledge as superior to scientific knowledge denoted a lack of 
understanding of the reality of climate science in the best case and a deliberate spread of 
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misinformation in the worst.   
Palin also attacked the uncertainty inherent to climate science. In her typical colloquial 
style, she argued that since ‘those computer models’ that ‘just can’t get the right answers’ are 
unable to predict next month’s weather, it follows that they cannot be relied upon to predict 
long-term changes in climate. This enthymeme alludes to a bogus synecdoche that conflates 
weather forecast with climate science and therefore collapses the latter into only one of its 
components. In an ambiguous claim Palin argued that ‘there is no convincing scientific 
evidence for man-made climate change’, refuting well-established scientific consensus on the 
matter and intentionally diffusing denialism. Her attack on climate science included equating 
it to eugenics and therefore not only refuting its existence as a credible scientific discipline, 
but also questioning its moral validity. Climate experts, she argued, cannot be classified as 
scientists: if they were scientists, they would be able to produce accurate facts, rather than 
‘imperceptible’ predictions. Palin’s reasoning reproduced one of the most widely used 
epistemological arguments against climate science: it is unable to deal with uncertainty, 
therefore it is not ‘true science’. This line of thinking reveals a distorted understanding of the 
task of science and demands from it to abandon its most fundamental premise: by its very 
nature it results to only provisional findings that remain open to peer review by the scientific 
community.  
Palin identified the economically weakest strands of society as those most affected by 
environmental regulation. This claim is in contrast to extensive research that evidences that 
environmental risks are unequally distributed in societies, with class and race being the 
dominant factors in this distribution (Mohai et al 2009). However, this rhetorical maneuver 
enabled her both to add an emotional element to her argument and to appeal to the religious 
conservative base. She argued that ‘climate change hysteria’ hurts the poorest in American 
society, because it limits their access to prosperity, which can come only from ‘affordable 
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and reliable energy sources’. The solution to this inequality, Palin suggested, could come 
through ‘responsible energy development’, defined as development that ‘protects the Earth 
while still allowing us to utilise our God-given resources… put here for mankind to 
responsibly use’. This statement further reveals the ontological premises that infuse Palin’s 
worldview and sheds light on the impact of religiosity on her understanding of the 
relationship of humans to the natural world.  
Palin’s views reflected and enhanced those of her audience, since the Tea Party was 
overwhelmingly supported by Americans who supported the conservative Christian 
movement or the religious Right (Pew Research Center 2011). By appropriating and 
reproducing the familiar religion-based argument that presents nature as a set of resources 
available to humans, Palin was further enhancing her potential for continuing to be 
recognised as the movement’s leader, while diffusing climate denialism as a legitimate point 
of view. As a frontier individual, Palin affirmed changes in weather patterns as a natural 
phenomenon; since the ‘climate has always been changing’, there is no legitimate basis on 
which to resort on extraordinary measures by changing the way Americans live their lives. In 
accordance with her ontological position, she affirmed nature as an assemblage of natural 
resources to be exploited and extracted by humans. As an evangelical Christian, she justified 
this by appealing to a divine plan that sets nature at the service of human needs. Her 
common-sense reasoning bridged her extractive ideology with her religiosity, an association 
that reproduced established conservative worldviews.  
Palin’s anti-intellectualism also resonated well with the spirit that prevailed in 2016 during 
the US Presidential campaign. Despite the fact that other than delivering an endorsement 
speech for Trump she did not play any significant role in the election, the celebrity status that 
she enjoyed allowed her to actively participate in numerous public events, including one that 
explicitly promoted climate change denial. The event had the form of a panel discussion for 
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the promotion of the film Climate Hustle, an anti-climate change documentary, which claims 
to ‘debunk outrageous claims about temperatures’ and “expose the increasingly shrill calls to 
‘act immediately before it’s too late’” (Rogers 2016).4 The fact that Palin was invited to 
participate in this event further evidences her eminent position among celebrity climate 
deniers. During an interview given before the event Palin said that she was ‘very passionate 
about this issue’ and she continued her attacks to climate scientists, this time branding them 
as ‘fearmongers’ who claim that ‘global warming is due to man’s activities, whereas this 
[film] presents strong arguments against that in a very relatable way’. On this occasion Palin 
took her argument against climate science to another level, claiming that climate change has 
been made into a campaign issue by ‘people who do not believe in American exceptionalism’ 
(McNary 2016). Pro-environment campaigners are no more just enemies of free markets, the 
word of God, or common sense, but also of the country. Continuing along the lines of 
conspiracy thinking, she referred to ‘those who… are controlling the narrative right now on 
changes in the weather’ and noted that ‘there is definitely a political agenda behind all of 
this’. Ironically, she even stated that ‘the science is kind of getting thrown out of the window 
in discussions about changes in the weather… it leads us to believe that so many things then 
coming from the scientists could be bogus. If this is bogus, what else are they trying to tell us 
and control us around?’ Palin’s rhetoric was frequently seen as chaotic; her climate change 
denialism proved it also misleading and dangerous.    
 
Conclusion 
The election of a climate denier as the 45th US President and the consequent emergence of 
deniers in key political posts evidenced in the starkest way that climate denialism is an 
acceptable force in American public life, particularly among the conservative movement. The 
contribution of celebrities such as Palin to this result should not be neglected: her 
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participation in ‘the denial machine’ contributed to the diffusion of contrarian views, keeping 
them alive in the hearts and minds of those inclined to accept them. As this article 
demonstrated, speaking common sense is a particular useful way to capture the imagination 
of ideologically positioned audiences. In line with the scholarship on ‘spectacular 
environmentalisms’, this article showed that celebrity contrarian voices contribute 
significantly to the production of social meaning and shared values.   
More specifically, the article analysed how Palin used her ethos to contribute to the 
political polarisation on climate change and to advance anti-environmental agendas, while 
presenting them as common sense. The analysis demonstrated how familiar ideological 
commonplaces—in this instance frontier authenticity and anti-intellectualism—function as 
resources for the creation of celebrity capital and the advance of political causes. With the 
support of ‘the denial machine’ Palin registered denialism in public discourse, fixating the 
challenge of climate science as common sense for those who shared her conservative 
worldview. Ultimately, she contributed to the popularisation of common-sense conservatism, 
a political conviction that is informed by the topoi of ontological dualism and anti-
intellectualism  and that advances climate denialism. The contribution of this article, then, is 
double. On the level of scholarly discussion, it offers an analytical framework that bridges the 
study of discourse, public character, and socio-political context. On a broader level, it shows 
how celebreticians and their ideological conviction can fit in ‘the denial machine’; as an 
exemplar of the celebritisation of political life, Palin’s case functions as an instance of the 
ramifications of this trend. 
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1 ‘Scepticism’, ‘denialism,” and ‘contrarianism’ are used by scholars to characterise the stream of 
thought that denies the authenticity of environmental problems, typically by rejecting climate science 
and opposing environmental regulation policies, see Jacques (2006, 2008). I have opted for the terms 
‘deniers’ and ‘denialism’ rather than ‘sceptics’ and ‘scepticism’. This is because ‘scepticism’ denotes 
a careful, balanced cross-examination of evidence and facts and is indeed an inherent trait of science. 
In contrast, and especially in view of the indisputable scientific consensus on the reality, causes, and 
impact of anthropogenic climate change, attempts to discredit the authority of the scientific enterprise 
are malicious and toxic. See Dunlap (2013). 
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2 The George W. Bush administration (2001-2008) pursued anti-regulation policies. With the election 
of Donald Trump denialism returned to the White House; his cabinet included well-known climate 
deniers Scott Pruitt (Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency), Ryan Zinke (Secretary 
of the Interior), and Rex Tillerson (Secretary of State). 
3 Melling (2013) observes that Palin’s hometown, which she served as a councillor and mayor, is not 
a small town, but an exurb, part of a larger metropolitan network. However, by using a broad and 
fairly abstract definition of “small town” that could encompass farming and factory towns, Palin 
addressed those who are attracted to the idea of the idyllic small-town experience. 
4 The production of the film was funded by the Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow, a non-profit 
organisation associated with ‘the denial machine’ and fossil fuel industry.  
 
 
 
